Erasmus, Luther, Augustine...and truth.

We have certainly found ourselves in a predicted connundrum through the study of rhetoric over the past few weeks. The pursuit of rhetorical excellence, and through a solution to problems and disputes through rhetoric leads by the admission or the charge of most of all of our writers (the majority admit it, Plato angrily asserts it, as do other more dogmatic writers) that we are "ever learning, and never able to come to a knowledge of the truth" (2 Tim. 3:7) While Paul made this assertion with the big T truth of the Christian gospel in mind, it nonetheless applies well to the repetitive, circular arguments in which we have immersed ourselves in both the texts and the class.

In another Pauline passage, one that has come up in class already, most of the writers we have studied and, I believe, all of us in class have admitted that "for now we see through a glass darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12). I have no problem with the idea that we, as human beings, have an extremely limited perception of the realities of existence, of the truths that I believe are somewhere out there. We are unable through our own searching and learning to reach any truth that we can have confidence in. There are two simple possibilities: either truth is available from a source outside reality as we are able to perceive/receive it, from the other side of Paul's dark glass, if you will, or there is no truth and we live in the meaningless, absurd universe of the existentialists. Neitszche can call me a coward if he pleases, and despise my weakness as a follower of Christ (as I am a Mormon and most "Christians" refuse to let me into their club, I am hesitant to adopt that title as my own), I refuse either out of hope or fear or pure obstinacy a purposeless, meaningless world.

I read a book recently by Neal Stephenson that hypothesized that human beings search for a narrative in which to fit themselves, a larger story they can be part of and the character framing this idea suggests this is part of the reason for religion's success, it provides a powerful narrative. Perhaps that is what drives me. While I have an absolute faith in my own position, (by which I mean that despite a lack of knowledge in the traditional, rational, scientific western sense I have a basic certainty of underlying principles) I like to think that I am closer to Erasmus, hesitant to assign myself any special knowledge ("Erasmus does not claim knowledge but has only questions and some tentatively held opinions" [Conley 123]) about the nature of the universe or truth beyond a few basic tenets of my faith.

Erasmus is perhaps the most appealing of the three, in that he argues as a scholar, despite defending a religious position. He does not claim to have some superior infallible knowledge of the meaning of scripture, or to be "adhering to the simple, pure, and natural meaning of the words" (Conley 123) as if any text, including the text of scritpure, could be read withtout interpretation as Luther's comment implies. Instead, Erasmus pursues the best of the Socratic position in arguing. He "does not claim knowledge," and "does not attempt to construct watertight proofs" (Conley 123). Instead he uses in utramque partem and argues his case by making both arguments, pointing out the probablities, and leaving the ultimate decision with the reader.

An aside here: the ability to argue both sides does not necessarily make one an amoral, unethical opportunist. Specifically using a presentation of both sides, arguing in utramque partem, to make your point doesn't either. It is too easy to point a finger and say oh, you just switch positions on any important issue when the wind blows and to yell "hypocrite." The best debaters, speakers, literary critics, and scholars in general take this approach to any problem even if they don't frame their argument in this fashion, learning both sides so that a decision can be reached, a side taken (if taking sides is necessary), or a third way found with the fullest possible knowledge of what is going on in the debate/discussion etc. It's not as simple as being a slimy lawyer with a gift for delivery.

Erasmus is clearly erudite and knowledgable in the best of both traditions, without losing either his faith or his scholar's edge. His rhetoric, which Conley describes as the "old humanist" at least once (I can't find it in exactly those words just now, but such a characterization is at least implied where old is understood to refer to a rhetorical theory and approach more in line with the classical tradition), is based on controversia and recognizing clearly the glass before his eyes makes no special claims for his arguments over anyone else's. He plays by traditional rules. I would like to think that I function as a scholar in a similar fashion, keeping my faith out of my academics, and arguing based upon the material at hand and with no claims to special knowledge from beyond.

I would assume (despite what assuming does) that Erasmus, in the modern world, would balance faith and skepticism, choosing faith where faith and science are apparently in conflict and waiting for a clearer view through the glass. I like to think that is how I handle any apparent conflicts that I encounter.

Luther, who is less spoken of because somewhat less relevant to our discussion, plays the game in an entirely different manner. He "asserted, and [would] still assert," leaving no room in his text for the reader's intellect to participate in the conscious creation of meanings or solutions. Instead he is ready to dictate to us from his enlightened position and help us escape our benighted understanding. Having read a portion of this argument before in which the reading focused on the argument itself rather than on the argument's rhetorical aspects, I can say that I was turned off by Luther's paternal condescension toward anyone who didn't agree with him.

Perhaps Luther should have read Augustine more fully before leaving his vocation as a Catholic monk. I wrongly expected to find Augustine more doctrinaire, closer to the lines of a Lutherian absolutism. What I found in Augustine's text was quite different. I emphasize the I because I am certain others will read Augustine differently. Granted that it would seem logical for someone with Augustine's background, but we finally have a rational resolution of the vir bonus dicendi peritus. Augustine makes no attempt to argue that an evil person cannot be rhetorically effective. In fact, he points to the potential effectiveness of a hypocrite arguing in favor of a "true" proposition (in this case the gospel) because of the naturally appealing nature of truth. However, he comes down on the side of the vir bonus dicendi peritus in his arguments for wisdom over eloquence, and the increased effectiveness of the good man whos life doesn't argue against him as he speaks. Wisely, there is no special moralizing power attached to rhetoric (as is vaguely hinted at in some of our other readings), nor is there any argument that something in the nature of either evil or rhetoric would prevent its use by someone whose morals Augustine wouldn't have approved of.

Of particular interest to me was his emphasis on the power of truth to appeal of its own accord regardless of the speaker. (Granted, my intereset assumes the possibility that truth of some sort is enough within our reach to have a statement about events that would be generally accepted as "true.") This would indicate that truth is truth regardless of who the presenter. Augustine's willingness to admit that someone batting for the other team might present truth as well, (an interpretation and stretching of the argument, but nothing in this excerpt seems to contradict it unless non-textual biases toward a religious position are allowed to take the place of textual evidence) that "they [might be] heard with profit" by believers is a refreshing stance that Luther could have adopted to his credit.